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One of the primary objectives of social security is to replace
income during retirement. In so doing,, social security benefits
supplement and partially substitute for prior savings. The presence
of these benefits is therefore expected to affect individuals' decisions
concerning consumption, savings and labor supply, including the
choice of retirement age. The purpose of the present paper is to
focus on the potential inducement to retire earlier in the presence
of social security and on the implied effects on lifetime savings.
This problem is analyzed within the framework of a model of
intertemporal utility ma.ximization. It is assumed that individuals can
either work full time or not work at all. During their working phase,
individuals pay a social security tax each period. After retirement
they are eligible to receive each period a pension from social security
which, in general, may depend on their retirement age and on their
*Thepaper is prepared for presentation at the NBER Confer-
ence on Social Insurance at Stanford in January 1977.—2—
prior earnings. A consumption path and a retirement age are chosen
so as to maximize lifetime utility.
Aggregate behavior is examined against two alternative hypotheses.
Initially it is assumed that each generation's present discounted value of
payments to and benefits from social security are equal. This assump-
tion is intended to separate the substitution effe'ts from the
intergenerational transfer aspects of a social security program. As is
well known, a program which is based on a'pay-as -you-go' principle
generates intergenerational transfers when the long-run growth rate of..
population is different from the rate of interest used to discount incomes.
The second part of the paper incorporates these transfers into the
analysis.
An examination of the equilibrium conditions for the economy
reveals the possibility for the existence of multiple equilibria in the
presence of social security. Dynamic considerations are then suggested
to identify which equilibria are locally stable or unstable. Subsequent
comparative static analysis focuses on the stable equilibria. In
particular, we evaluate the effects of balanced changes in social
security benefits and taxes on the equilibrium retirement age and on
the individuals' wealth-income ratio at retirement, under alternative
assumptions concerning the dependence of the benefits formula on the
retirement age.
The results in this part pertain to a simple case of the underlying
model and can be summarized as follows:
(1) Social security benefits have a very pronounced effect in
inducing earlier retirement. For example, when the system—3--
is balanced for each generation, a replacement ratio of twenty
percent reduces the retirement age by more than fifty percent
relative to retirement in the absence of social security.
(2) The effect on accelerated retirement can be significantly
mitigated by allowing benefits to depend positively upon the
retirement age. For example, when benefits provide a return
on postponement of retirement equal to the rate of interest,
then a replacement ratio of twenty percent reduces retirement age
only by ten percent relative to retirement in the absence of
social security.
(3) The effect of social security benefits on an individual's
wealth-income ratio at retirement is uncertain. While
increased benefits reduce the need for one's own savings during
retirement, induced earlier retirement may lead to more
savings during the working phase so as to partially offset the
loss in earnings. The results suggest that for a relatively long
time horizon the former effect always dominates the latter.
Again, the reduction in the wealth-income ratio can be mitigated
by allowing the benefits formula to depend upon retirement age.
Some of these conclusions have to be modified when a "wealth-
effect" via intergenerational transfers is allowed. Increases in the
population growth rate enable, for given levels of benefits, a reduction
in tax rates, thereby leading to a reduction in the equilibrium retire-
ment age. The magnitude of this effect is positively related to the level
of the replacement ratio and negatively to the rate of population growth.-4-
The results suggest that the effects on earlier retirement of increased
taxes cannot be neglected when, as currently in the U.S.,adecrease
in the population growth rate requires higher tax rates in order to pre-
serve existing replacement ratios.
An important feature of the post-war U.S. economy has been the
rapid decrease in the labor force participation of the elderly. How
much of this decrease can be attributed to the emergence of social
security, private pension funds or just "poor health" is a matter of
debate. Recent results suggest, however, that certain aspects of the
social security program, such as the income guarantee and the earnings
test, have been a major factor in inducing earlier retirement.Thus,
while the idealized life-time planning model described in this paper may
be inappropriate for the behavior of a certain fraction of the population
(Diamond [1976] ),itreveals the potential distortions created by a social
security program for individuals that behave rationally. Obviously,
these distortions should be evaluated against the redistributive and other
objectives of the social security program, not analyzed in this paper.
The organization of this work is as follows. Section 2 presents the
model of individual optimization and of the market equilibrium. Sections
3 through 5 present the comparative statics analysis. Section 3 evalu-
ates the effects on the equilibrium retirement age, section 4 modifies the
benefits formula to depend on retirement age and section 5 examines the
wealth-income ratio effect. Section 6 introduces the intergenerational
transfer problem. Section 7 presents the general model underlying the
previous sections.—5—
2. Individual Optimization and Market Equilibriurn: A Simple Model
Our objective is to construct a model of a competitive economy
with a system of social security benefits, focusing on the effect of this
system on individuals' retirement decisions. It seems most useful to
consider initially a simple case that brings out some of the main issues
involved, to be followed subsequently by a more con'olete model. Such
a detailed model, which rigorously justifies the analysis in this section
and includes elements neglected here, is presented in section 7.
Consider first a single individual's problem of choosing jointly an
optimum consumption and retirement plan. Suppose that the individual
has a given life horizon of T, and that he decides to have a fixed level
of consumption, c, over his entire lifetime. As is well known, the
choice of a constant consumption level is optimal for a utility maximizing
individual provided his subjective time preference is equal to the rate of
interest.
When working, the individual is assumed to receive a fixed wage,
w, independent of age. The amount of labor supplied while working
cannot be varied. He may, however, decide to retire from work before
the age of T, in which case he is entitled thereafter to social security
benefits, at a given level b.
In a perfectly competitive capital market, with free lending and
borrowing at a fixed rate of interest, r, the individual's budget constraint
equalizes the present values of consumption and income. Treating age, t,
as a continuous variable this constraint is written—6—
T R T




c(1—e) - w(1—e ) — b(e —e ) = 0 (2.1)
where R (T R0) denotes the retirement age.
Theindividual's optimum retirement is chosen to be the age where
the benefits and costs of retirement balance. Assume that he has a fixed
utility from retirement (or leisure), v, independent of age. Upon retire-
ment he loses an income of w-b. Assume further that his marginal
utility of consumption is equal to the inverse of the level of consumption.
2
Then his loss in terms of utility is equal to ct(w-b). Thus, the
individual's net marginal utility of postponing retirement, ,isequal to
=c1(w-b)-v.The first-order condition that determines the optimum
R is therefore
dU-1(w-b)-v0 (2.2)
An interior solution satisfying (2.2) requires, of course, that
w > b. Equations (2. 1) and (2.2) simultaneously determine the individual's
optimum R and c. It is easy to verify that the second-order condition
_2 U<0 is satisfied everywhere, and hence that when an optimum exists,
dR
it is unique.
Suppose further that the economy consists of numerous identical
individuals, and can thus be represented by a single individual. At the
outset, we wish todisregard the question of transfers between different
generations. This issue is treated in section 6. We therefore postulate-7-
that the present value of social security benefits is equal to the present
value of deductions for each generation.
Assume that the individual receives before tax a wage of w from
which a fraction 1 > 60 is deducted for social security. Thus, his
net wage, w, is equal to w =w(1-0). The social security1s budget
constraint is given by
eRe_rtdt=bf:e_rtdt
or
--rR-rR -rT Ow(1-e )- b(e-e )= 0 (2.3)
Substituting (2.3) into (2. 1) and (2.2) we obtain two equilibrium
conditions for the economy, denoted by cu and cp,
cu'(R,c)ccb-w=0 (2.4)
and
(R,c) c(-b) -v=0 (2.5)
1-rT
where Ris uniquely related to R. Equations (2.4) and (2.5) 1-e
determine the economyts equilibrium R and c for any given benefit level
**
b.Denote such an equilibrium by (R ,c ).ttturns out that the solution
to these equations is in general non—unique. Specifically, substituting
(2.4) into (2.5) yields a quadratic equation in ,
(2.6)
where /3 is the Ureplacement ratio,t i.e. ,theratio of social
security benefits to before-tax income. Notice that the solution depends—8—
only on /3andnot separately on the level of benefits and income.Now,
for any positive /3, equation (2. 6) has generally two solutions:
1.Jl-4$v
2/3 (2.7)
The solutions (2. 7) are real-valued provided 1- 413v > 0. This
imposes an upper bound on the size of social security benefits. The
functionis monotone, strictly decreasing in R, with =1when R =T.
From (2. 6),=vwhen /30. Hence, to ensure that individuals choose
to retire before T in the absence of social security, we assume thatv> 1.
* ,c * Denotethe two solutions to (2.6) by (R1, c1) and (R2, c2), illus-
trated by points A and B in Figure 1. It is easy to verify that the curves
i(R,c) =0and ço(R,c)0 intersect at these points as described. Let
the equilibrium in the absence of social security be denoted by (H, c).
The level of H is determined by (2.6) when (l) v. One can show
that =_1-i3v>v forany /3>0. Itfollows that R>R>R.
That is, in the presence of a social security program the economy has
in general two equilibrium points, each having a lower optimum retire-
ment age than in the abs ence of such a program.
The existence of multiple equilibria, familiar in "second-best"
theory, has a straightforward explanation. Given a certain level of
benefits, b, the movement from A to B (in Figure 1) is obtained by an
increase in social security taxes, 0,alongwith a decrease in the opti-
mum retirement age. Individuals choose to retire earlier because the
opportunity costs of retirement, w-b, decrease due to the reduction in
the net wage w =w(1-0).The existence of multiple equilibria for the
















ationfrom the individualts point of view (Figure 1), since he considers
his net wage as given, thereby disregarding the effect of.his retirement
decisions on the tax rate via the "macro't constraint, (2. 3).
Under certain assumptions concerning the adjustments made by
individuals in disequilibrium situations, one equilibrium point can be
shown to be locally stable and the other to be locally unstable. Thus,
suppose that tax rates are adjusted instantaneously so as to preserve
the social security's constraint (2. 3). On the other hand, individuals
are assumed to adjust their retirement age upwards when the net bene-
fits of postponing retirement, c(w-b)-v, are positive and vice versa.
Similarly, the consumption level is assumed to be adjusted downwards
when the present value of consumption exceeds lifetime earning, and fr
viceversa. Using (2. 3), these assumptions can be expressed formally
by the differential equations
- -rR cG((w-cq)(l-e)) (2.8)
and
F(c1(w-b)-v) (2.9)
where H. andare time derivatives of the respective variables, and
F and G are sign-preserving, monotone-increasing functions.
Linearizing the system (2.8)-(2.9) around the equilibrium point RcO,
it is easy to verify that (Ri, c) (point A in Figure 1) is a locally stable
equilibrium and (R, c) (point B) is a locally unstable equilibrium.
To summarize the present discussion, it has been demonstrated
that in the presence of social security the competitive economy has two—11—
equilibrium points. Under certain dynamic assumptions it can be shown
that one equilibrium is locally stable and the other is locally unstable.
It has further been shown that any equilibrium associated with a positive
level of social security benefits has a lower equilibrium retirement age
and a lower consumption level than these equilibrium values in the
absence of social security.—12—
3. Comparative Statics of the Simple Model







The 'effect of a change in the level of social security benefits on
the equilibrium configuration clearly depends on the initial equilibrium
considered.
The sign of the denominator in (3. 1) and (3.2) is positive at the
stable solution and negative at the unstable solution to (2. 7). Hence,
at the stable point, <0and < 0 (shift from point A to point A'
in Figure 1). Opposite results obtain at the unstable equilibrium.
Some levels of RT for alternative values of /3 are presented in
Table 1. These levels pertain to the stable solutions of (2. 7).Itis
seen that increases in social security benefits have a substantial effect
on reducing the optimum retirement age. For example, a replacement
ratio of twenty percent more than halves the chosen retirement age,
compared to retirement in the absence of social security.
The large reduction in the retirement age is reflected in the
correspondingly large increase in the tax rate, 6, required to finance
these replacement ratios. For example, a twenty percent ratio already
requires a twelve percent tax rate.—13—
Table 1
Optimum Retirement Age and Tax Rate for
Alternative Replacement Ratios
a
The unrealistically large response of the optimum retirement age
could be mitigated by either one of two assumptions. First, assuming
that the utilityof retirement, v, is age-dependent. Specifically, if v
were an increasing function of R, the effect of an increase in onR*
can be expected to be smaller. Second, allowing the benefit functionto
depend positively upon R would also work to reduce the response of


















a Calculated from (2. 3), (2.4) and (2. 5), with r
v =1086.The differences in the values of 6
and T = were insignificant.-14-
4. Allowing Benefits to Depend Upon Retirement Age
The simplest way to make benefits depend upon retirement age is
to postulate that they are paid-out to a retired individual provided his
A
ageexceeds a minimum level, say R. If retired before the age of R,
benefits nevertheless are paid only beyond the minimum age.
Under this stipulation, the individual's budget constraint, (2. 1),
becomes
-rT -rR-rR -rT c(1-e)= w(1-e)+ b(e-e) (4.1)
where R Max [R,R]. Furthermore, by (4. 1), the marginal utility of
retirement, ,isnow given by







c(w-b)-Y - - R -R TRR
w(1—er)+b(er-er
Equation (4.2) is a decreasing function of R, having a (negative)
discontinuity at R (Figure 2). As b increases,shifts downwards.
Eventually, the two parts of (4. 2) will be positive and negative
respectively, implying that the optimum retirement age is H. Thus,
over a certain range of values of b, the optimum retirement age remains
A *
R.That is, in this range R is inelastic with respect to .Thiscon-
forms, perhaps, to the "clusteringt' of observed retirement ages in the









Suppose, alternatively, that benefits are allowed to depend continu-
ously upon the retirement age, b =b(R).The income ben'efits from a
marginal postponement of retirement are now given by
3b 1 -r(T-R) w-b+——(1-e 3Rr
where the last expression is the marginal change in benefits due to the
postponement of retirement, integrated over the retirement period and
• . discountedto the retirement date. We naturally assume that 0.
Condition (2.2) that determines the individual's optimum retirement
age now becomes
dU-ir b 1. -r(T-R) 1 wcj.w-b+—(l-e)j-v0 (4.3)
From (2. 1), (2.3) and (4. 3), the equilibrium conditions for the
economy are now (2.4) and
(R,c) C[-b(-(l-eTR)))} v =0 (4.4)
where r= -isthe percentage yield in benefits on postponement of
retirement. Substituting from (2.4) into (4. 4) provides an equation to
*
determineR
-{i+ (leT)] +v0 (4. 5)
As in the previous case, equation (4.5) has, in genertl, multiple
solutions. Clearly, when ri0 and T is finite, the solutions to (4. 5)
must be found by iterative procedures. Some values of H for alter-
native levels of j3, riandT are presented in Table 2. These values
pertain to the stable solution of (4. 5).—17—
Before we discuss these calculations, consider the possibility of
*
settingTIata level which will make R independent of J3, and therefore
equal to its value in the absence of social security. By (4. 4), this
condition is satisfied when =r[l-e_r(T)_1 >r.In the special case
that T ,thiscondition simplifies to the form
brR+log(l_erR) (4.6)
whereis a scalar independent of R. Observe that efficiency requires
the yield on postponement of retirement to be larger than the rate of
interest, and also to be age-dependent. Specifically, the yield is seen
to decrease with age, approaching r from above. The reason is quite
clear. Postponement of retirement not only reduces the period over
which benefits have to be paid, but also increases the period over which
taxes are collected. This interpretation is particularly transparent in
the infinite horizon case. The gain to social security from a marginal
postponement of retirement is equal to saving b. The cost is equal to
the present value of the inreased taxes required to finance the additional
1-rRab .. ..
benefits,(l-e)--.Atan efficient equilibrium these costs and
benefits are equal.-18-
Table 2
Optimum Retirement Age for Alternative Replacemen.t Ratios
When the Benefits Function Depends on Retirement a
T70 T=oo
r)=.02ri=.04 rj=.02 ri=.04
0 50 50 63.40 63,40
.01 48.7549.20 61.85 63.13
.05 44. 1646.18 55.84 62. 10
.10 38.85 42.51 49.12 60.64
.15 34.38 39.32 43.20 59.27
.20 29.30 36.45 37.31 57.59
aCalculated from (4. 5), with r.04 and r1. 086.
Comparing the results in Tables 1 and 2, it is seen that the
dependence of the benefits function upon retirement age has a significant
effect on the equilibrium levels of R'. For example, when the benefits
function provides a four percent yield on retirement postponement, then
a replacement ratio of twenty percent reduces the optimum retirement
age by approximately ten percent compared to retirement in the absence
of social security benefits, while without such a provision the reduction
is more than eighty percent. Still, we notice that even with n.04
(equal to the rate of interest in these calculations), the elasticity of
*1R retirement with respect to the replacement ratio, —-—-—,isof the
R
order of .5, which seems quite large.
We conclude, therefore, that allowing benefits to depend (positively)
on retirement age has a potentially large effect on diminishing the-19-
negative effects of social security on retirement age, yet, in the studied
range of parameters, the response of retirement ae to changes in bene-
fits cannot be disregarded.-20-
5. Social Security and the Optimum Wealth-Income Ratio at Retirement
We now return to the assumption that benefits do not depend on
retirement age, and focus on the effect of social security on savings.
While working, individuals save w-c each period, until retirement. These
savings, compounded at an interest rate of r, amount to
s fR (w_c)ert dt(w-c) (erR_i) (5 1)
at the retirement age R. Substituting from (2.4) into (5. 1), the ratio of
wealth, S, to income before tax, w, at retirement, denoted by s, is
given by
s == (i_eT)(_/3) (5.2)
From (2.6) and (2.7) one can verify that in equilibrium, > [3 for any
13>0, and hence that s > 0.
Using conditions (2.4) and (2. 5), the equilibrium change in s due
to an increase in f3 is found to be
ds1 /1_-_[3\ _r(T_R*) _rR*-rR -rT rR (i-e)-2(e-e)]e
(5.3)
The sign of (5.3) is generally indeterminate. It depends, in
particular, on whether the initial equilibrium point is locally stable or
unstable, on the equilibrium value ofR and on the parameters r and T.
By (2. 7), at the stable equilibrium (point A in Figure l), i-213 > 0
(< 0 at point B). The sign of (5. 3) is then the same as the sign of the
term in square brackets. Clearly, for large values of T, this sign is—21—
negative.However, for finite values of T, a positive sign is possible.
Some calculations of the equilibrium values of H. and s with typical
parameters are presented in Table 3 below.
Table 3
Optimum Wealth-Income Ratio and Retirement Age
for Alternative Replacement Ratios
a
T60 T70 T=85 T=co
* * * *
R s R s R s R s
045.39 10.19 50.00 12.66 55.98 15.81 63.40 23.02
.01 44.02 10.63 48.46 13.05 53.07 16.24 60.41 22.52
.05 38.94 11.64 42.28 13.72 45.67 16.2150.63 20.45
.10 33.04 11.41 35.51 13.23 37.80 14.99 41.0617.66
.15 27.39 10.60 29.15 11.72 30.74 12.89 32.92 14.55
.20 21.138.4322.299.10 24.109.75 24.68 10.68
aCalculated from (2.7) and(5.2) for r = .04 and v = 1.086.
Fromthis table and the accompanying diagram (Figure 3)it is
seenthat for finite T in the chosen range, the optimum values of s first
rise and then fall as increases. Furthermore, as T increases, the
increasing phase of s diminishes, eventually vanishing when T becomes
infinitely large.
The reason for the ambiguous sign of the relation between the opti—
mum wealth-income ratio at retirement and the replacement ratio seems
clear. An increase in the replacement ratio directly reduces the need to










0 .05 .1 .15
Figure 3—23—
reduction in the chosen retirement age increases the retirement period
and this requires, in order to maintain the consumption level, a larger
wealth at retirement. These effects work in opposite directions and the
net outcome cannot be determined a priori.—32—
Weshallmake this assumption throughout. It is satisfied, for example,
WR R when r-ó0, 0 and b(R,w )ismonotone and concave in R:
= + ____>db---+_—(aw<0The dR R aR R dR 3R2 3R\3R 8R I
conditionthat r-ó0 implies, by (7. 3), that consumption does not
8wR decrease with age, while the condition 0 implies that the wage
* rate is not increasing at R
Assuming that for each generation the present value of benefits





where 0isthe social security tax rate.
In analogy with standard tax theory, it is assumed that individuals
ignore the impact of their decisions on the aggregate constraint (7. 11).
This isa plausible assumption under competitive conditions with many
individuals.




jTh(X*er)t)ert dt -fRert dt =0 (7. 13)
where—25—
O(ler)- 0 (6.2)







In analogy with (2. 4)-(2.5),
l-e l-e
conditions (6. 3)-(6. 4)determine the economy's equilibrium levels
(R*,c*) for given r and g. The former conditions are clearlya special
caseof the latter when r =g.
Furthersubstituting (6.3) into (6.4) yields an equation in R





For given 13, v, r and g, equation (6.5) has, in general, multiple
solutions. This can be seen by expanding the functions cbbytheir linear
terms only. Equation (6. 5) then becomes a quadratic equation in R,
which may generally have two positive solutions. As before, one can
infer which solution is locally stable and which is locally unstable. We
shall not pursue the characterization of these solutions here. Instead,
*
weproceed to calculate the stable valuesof R andc for some alterna-
tive levels of j3 and g. These calculations are presented in Table 4.—26—
Table4
Optimum Retirement Age and Tax Rate for Alternative
Replacement Ratios and Growth Rates a
g.01 g.02 g.04 g.06
* * * * 6 R 0 R 0 R 9
0 50 0 50 0 50 0 50 0
.0148.46.00148.46.00148.46.00148.47 .001
.0542.17.00742.22.00742.28 .00742.31 .007
.1034.89 .020 35.19 .02035.51 .02035.66 .020
.15 26.84 .04528.05 .04229.15 .04029.62 .039
.20 10.00 .162 17.20 .12322.24 .074 23.65 .070
a
Calculated from (6.5) and (6.2) for r =.04,v =1.086and T 70.
The main features emerging from these calculations seem to be
thefollowing.
The effect of increases in the replacement ratio on reducing the
optimum retirement age is larger the smaller is the rate of growth of
population. This should be expected since at low rates of growth a given
increase in benefits requires a relatively large increase intaxes, which
induces the earlier retirement.
For a given replacement ratio, higher population growth rates
lead to increases in the equilibrium retirementage. Clearly, higher
growth rates imply a shift in the age distribution towards theyounger
ages and thus enable a reduction in the tax rates required to finance the
given level of benefits. This effect is relatively small at low replace-
ment ratios, but very significant at higher replacement ratios. For—27—
example, at a replacement ratio of ten percent an increase in the growth
rate from two to four percent raises the retirement age by approximately
one percent, while at a replacement ratio of twenty percent the same
increase in growth raises retirement by almost thirty percent.
The effect of different growth rates on retirement age is reflected
in the implied tax rates. Generally, an increase in the population growth
rate enables a reduction of tax rates. These reductions are significant
at high replacement ratios and at low population growth rates.
The previous result seems to have an important bearing on current
attempts in the U.S. to adjust the level of social security taxes to the
projected decrease in the population growth rate. Our analysis suggests
that reductions in retirement ages brought about by the contemplated
increases in tax rates may substantially aggravate the problem. For
example, consider a replacement ratio of twenty percent and a decrease
in the population growth rate from 4 to 2 percent. From Table 4, the
initial equilibrium tax rate is approximately 7. 5 percent. If retirement
effects are neglected then, by (6. 2), the tax rate should riSe to approxi-
mately 10. 5 percent, compared with the equilibrium value of 12.3 percent.
Thus, neglecting the retirement effect leads to an error of approximately
sixteen percent in the equilibrium tax rate.—28—
7. A General Model of Individual Optimization and Market Equilibrium
The purpose of this section is to develop the general model of
individual optimization that underlies the analysis in the previous
sections. It will be shown that the formulation in section 2 is a special
case of the model presented below.
Let c denote the consumption of an individual at age t. For
simplicity, we assume that the individual can either work full time, in
which case his utility is u(c), or not work at all, in which case his utility
is ft(c,t)u(c) +v(t),where v(t) is the utility from retirement at age t.
In standard terminology, the utility function is additively separable in
consumption and leisure, with the utility of leisure being age-dependent.
We assume that u is twice differentiable, strictly monotone and concave
in c: u' > 0, u" < 0; and that v is positive and monotone in t: v >0,
V10.
The individual is assumed to have a life horizon of T >0,and to
have no bequest motive. Hence, if he retires at age R(T R 0), his
lifetime utility at age t0, denoted U, is given by
R T
U f u(ct)edt +fft(ct,t)edt
0 R (7.1)
=1Tu(ct)e_ót dt +v(t)e6dt
where 6 > 0 is a subjective constant discount rate. If he works, the
individual is assumed to receive a wageat age t, from which a
fixed fraction 0(1> 0> 0)is deducted for social security. His net
wage at age t, w, is thus w-29-
After retirement, the individual is eligible for social security
benefits. These benefits depend, in general, upon his retirement age
and upon certain characteristics of his wage profile up to retirement.
Denote this characteristic by R. For example, benefits may depend
on the (arithmetic) average of his wages until retirement,
1R= f dt. With minor exceptions, this is the case in the U.S.
0
Another conceivable rule is that benefits be granted according to the
maximum earnings obtained prior to retirement, =Max{wtIRto}.
Noticethat if the individual's lifetime earnings have the standard shape,
increasing initially and then decreasing, and if the individual retires
after passing his income peak, then in the latter caseis unaffected
by R. In general, however, the basis for benefits, R, may be expected
to depend on the individual's retirement date. The benefit function,
denoted by b =b(R,wR),is assumed to be twice differentiable in R and
-R .8b ____ w,with 0 andRaw
It is assumed that the individual has no income except from wages
and social security benefits. In a perfectly competitive capital market,
with free lending and borrowing at a given rate of interest r, the indi-
vidual's budget constraint is given by
T R T
f ctert dt =fwtert dt +b(R,wR)f e't dt (7.2)
0 0 R
His objective is to maximize (7.1) with respect to ,w. r.t.)c and
R, subject to (1.2).The first-order conditions for an interior solution
are
(6—r)t (6—r)t u(ct)Xe or cth(Xe ) (7.3)-30—
and
(R,X,b) Xe(6 [wR-b+(+ a)!(le-rT-)] -v(R)0
(7.4)
where h u'1, and X > 0 a constant. An assumptio. that u'(O) =is
sufficient to ensure that (7.3) has an interior solution (Ct>0) for any
X> 0 and all t.




The interpretation of condition (7.4) is straightforward. The direct
loss in utility from further postponement of retirement is the utility of
retirement, ft(cR,R) -U(CR)v(R). The gain from such postponement
in terms of the present value of receipts is given by the expression in
square brackets. Multiplying this gain by u'(cR) Xer)Rconverts it
into utility units. Condition (7.4) states that at the optimum these gains
and losses should be equal.
Noticethat whenab/8R =0and awR/3R > 0, an interior solution
requires that> b, i.e.,thatsocial security benefits be smaller than
the wage rate at retirement. This is expected in view of the assumed
positive utility of retirement, v(R) > 0.
Equations (7.4) and (7.5) are two equations to determine the
individual's optimum H and X. We assume that there exists a unique
positive solution.to these equations, denoted by (R*, X*).By (7. 1), (7.4) and (7. 5), whenever the budget constraint (7.5) is
satisfied, dU/dR =eóRçp(R,x).Hence, we require that at (R*, )),the





____ alabab aw =x*e(6_R*IawR_ 8b +!(l_e_r(T_r*)) ___
-R
[aR raa3R)
-_r(TR*)/3b+3ba)] -v'(R)-(r-6)v(R) (7.7) -R R aw
* 3g7v(R< 0 (7.8) ax
____aw\-rR =- [- 1 _r(T_R*)\ (8b+&b-R ' *







1 h(xe )-rtdt <0 (7. 10) e a
wherea -u"(c)c/u'(à) denotes the elasticityof the marginal utility.
Inview of (7. 10), condition (7.6) requiresthat<0.By(7. 7)-
(7. 10), a sufficient condition forthe latter is that 0 at (R*, ),*)—32—
Weshallmake this assumption throughout. It is satisfied, for example,
WR R when r-ó0, 0 and b(R,w )ismonotone and concave in R:
= + ____>db---+_—(aw<0The dR R aR R dR 3R2 3R\3R 8R I
conditionthat r-ó0 implies, by (7. 3), that consumption does not
8wR decrease with age, while the condition 0 implies that the wage
* rate is not increasing at R
Assuming that for each generation the present value of benefits





where 0isthe social security tax rate.
In analogy with standard tax theory, it is assumed that individuals
ignore the impact of their decisions on the aggregate constraint (7. 11).
This isa plausible assumption under competitive conditions with many
individuals.




jTh(X*er)t)ert dt -fRert dt =0 (7. 13)
where—33—
(JR wte_rt dt +WR*1Tertdt)(j wtertdt)(7, 14)
Given the benefit function b, equations (7. 12) and (7. 13) determine
* * .* * theeconomy's equilibrium values of R and .Byconstruction, (R ,
satisfiesthe social security's budget constraint (7. 11). The effects of
**
policychanges on the equilibrium (R ,X)shouldthus be regarded as
compensated variations in the individuals' behavior.
We now notice that the equilibrium equations (2.4) and (2. 5) in
section 2 are a special case of (7. 12) and (7. 13) when u'(c)c'1,
v'(R)0 (that is, v(R) =v), =wand r6. Also note that in that
special case the second-order condition<0is trivially satisfied since
Oin(7.7).
Differentiating (7. 12) and (7. 13) at (R ,X )yields
=* (6_r)R*IR-ab+_r(T-.R*)-_r(TR*)b___
L 3R3R(çte )e -Raw
-b +
11- _r(T_R*))a(3b+ab____ e 3R\ 3R
-vl(R*)-'(r- 6) v(R*) (7. 15)
,_v(R )<0 (7 16) *
A * --rR<0 (7.17) wRe
=-1h(*ór)t)e_rt dt <0 (7. 18)
Let= (aq'/aR)(ao/ax) - (/a>)(a/aR). By(7. 15)-(7. 18), the sign
A* * ofat (R ,X)cannotbe established unless it can be shown that?0.-34-
However, even when 20in (7. 7), so as to satisfy the individual's
maximization second-order conditions, it can be seen that the sign of
(7. 15) is indeterminate. Indeed, as in the special case discussed in
section 2, the multiplicity of equilibrium points satisfying (7. 12)—(7. 13)
cannot be ruled out.
In order to examine briefly the effects of changes in the benefits
formula, we shall assume that the initial equilibrium point is locally
A * *
stable,i.e. ,<0at (R ,X ).
Achange in the benefits function can now be represented by a
general "shift" parameter a: b =b(R,wR,a).More specific assumptions
about the dependence of b on a will be made in the sequel.
Differentiating (7. 12) and (7. 13) totally w.r.t. a, using (7. 14),
we obtain
dR*=*e(ó_r)R3 3b 1r(TR*) 8(ab+3b
-a--- —( e 3a.8R -Rãi
L 3w
(7. 19)
dx*-Xe*3 8b 1(1 _r(T_R*)) 8 (3b+3b___
da L
e 8a \ 3P
(7. 20)
A *
Inview of (7. 17) and the assumption that <0 at (R ,X ),itis
seen that has the same sign and the opposite sign of the
expression
3b 1-r(T-R) 3 /3b3b____
-R8R ) (7.21)
3w p
Letus consider four special cases of (7. 21):—35—
ab 32b______ .. . (1)—>0and = 0.This is an additive increase in aaaR -R aaaw
* benefits.Such a change is seen to decrease R and to increase X
which implies, by (7. 3), a uniform decrease in c',:
2
(2)3 b> 0 and b=0.This is a case where the marginal -R 3a3w
return to postponing retirement, isincreased without affecting the
level of benefits, b. Such a change is seen to increase R' and to
decrease(and hence, to increase ct);
More generally, if
(3) —(- >0and-R0 then (7.21) is non-negative,
* . .*
implyinga decrease in R and an increase in X .Thecondition is that
the percentage change in benefits due to postponement of retirement,
. notexceed the rate of interest;
Finally, suppose
32b 3b32b . (4) > 0 and —_____ = 0.Since the increase in benefits -R 3a 3a8R 3a3w
increases with the variable R, this may be considered a regressive
-R *
changein benefits. When is positive thendR>0and<0, do' do'
and vice versa.
Various other comparative statics of the general model can be
considered, including the effect of social security benefits on the
wealth-income ratio at retirement and the effects of intergenerational
transfers. In most cases, one has to impose various restrictions on
the benefits function to obtain unambiguous results.-36-
Footnotes
1.See, for example, Steiner and Dorfman (1959), Long (1958),
Pechman, Aaron and Taussig (1968), Feldstein (1974) and
Boskin (1975).
2.See below, section 7.
3.This is not valid in general. For example, suppose that the
marginal utility of consumption is equal to c °,wherea is
a positive constant. Equations (2.5) and (2.6) now become
-a- --a a+1 -1-a a c [w-b1 -v0 and w b4-w +v =0,respectively.
Evidently, the latter equation cannot be expressed in terms of
j3 b/w alone except when a =1.
4.Due to fluctuations in employment and in the population of
eligible recipients, the social security program may occasion-
ally incur losses or gains. Thus, the application of this
principle should be interpreted as a long-run or average
formula.
5.In the non-separable case, the optimum consumption plan may
be discontinuous at the retirement age. Notice also that in a
model with uncertain lifetime, v(t) can be interpreted to
include the conditional probability of survival at t (Yaari [19641).—37-.
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